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Contemporary conversations about Palestine and Israel often place land and claims to land at the 
center of the conflict; however, such discussions rarely concern the structures of land policy and 
ownership at play. Reflecting on Israel’s recent dispossession of the Bedouin village of Umm al-
Hiran in the Naqab, this paper takes a historical approach to understanding the land tenure systems 
of Israel and the previous governing regimes over Palestine. Through a comparative analysis 
of Ottoman, British, and Israeli land laws, this piece shows how Israel’s ability to alienate and 
accumulate Palestinian land as state property was facilitated by the land systems that preceded it. 
The centrality of western forms of articulating ownership, especially land cultivation, thread together 
the land policies of these three regimes. While the implications of such articulations on the native 
Palestinians varied between Ottoman, British, and Israeli rule, the continuity between the three 
ultimately provided Israel the space to manipulate conceptions of ‘abandoned’ and ‘waste’ lands to 
their benefit as they dispossessed Palestinians of their property from the inception of the state to 
today.
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DEFINING LAND UNDER 
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE
“Many would say it’s a second Nakba for the Palestinians in the Naqab,” stated Suhad 
Bishara, the Director of Land and Planning 
Rights for Adalah, to describe the state 
of land appropriation in the Umm al-
Hiran, an unrecognized Bedouin village 
in the Naqab, the southern region desert 
of Israel.1 Since its inception, Israel has 
unabashedly maintained its right to alienate 
land and property from those it views as 
infringing upon its rights to the land. This 
continued entitlement is made all the more 
apparent in the case of Umm al-Hiran, 
as Bishara deliberately invokes the 1948 
mass expulsion of Palestinians by Israel in 
relation to Israel’s current dispossession 
of the unrecognized village. The use of 
Umm al-Hiran as a case study challenges 
common discourse around Israeli land 
accumulation. Generally, conversations 
about Israeli land theft center on its illegal 
annexation of Palestinian land in the West 
Bank. Through Umm al-Hiran, I challenge 
the view that Israeli land practices in the 
West Bank are ‘exceptional’ and beyond 
the norm. Rather, this case proves that 
Israeli land theft is the norm and follows 
in the tradition of past regimes ruling over 
Palestine, as I trace a longer legal lineage 
of land dispossession policies, illuminating 
the connection between Israel’s current 
land alienation practices and British and 
Ottoman land tenure systems.
Threaded throughout Ottoman, British, 
and Israeli land laws is the importance 
of communication and its role in defining 
property. Carol Rose outlines this in 
her article, “Possession as the Origin 
of Property,” explaining how claiming 
ownership of property hinges upon how the 
claims are articulated and communicated 
and how such articulations are received 
by external parties.2 Within the context of 
Palestine, Rose’s ideas around articulating 
ownership dovetail with the Lockean ideal 
of labor as the determining factor behind 
property and the colonial need to see land 
as both terra nullius and wasted. By tracing 
the representation and discussion of empty 
and waste lands through the Ottoman and 
British land tenure policies, we arrive at the 
reiteration of such elements as key to the 
rhetorical and legal articulations of Israeli 
land ownership. The culmination of the piece 
brings us into the contemporary era and 
reinforces the pervasiveness of intelligibility 
in articulations of land ownership as I 
return to Umm al-Hiran and the residents’ 
protests against the village’s demolition 
to make way for a new Jewish settlement.
Ottoman land reform took place during the 
Nahda, or renaissance period, of the Middle 
East during which the region increased 
its engagement with the West. During the 
Nahda, the Ottoman Empire undertook 
the Tanzimat, which were reforms moving 
Ottoman law away from a religious basis 
toward a secular one - a reangling of 
Ottoman bureaucracy to conform to Western 
conceptions of governance. Fitting into this 
larger schema of the Tanzimat, details of the 
1858 Ottoman Land Code exemplified this 
borrowing from the West during the Nahda. 
While the Tanzimat, and specifically the land 
laws, may not have intentionally aimed to 
be intelligi//ble to its Western counterparts, 
the reality of pulling from Western formats, 
especially the British and French, provided a 
legal structure that conveniently fit with the 
goals and norms of these later colonizing 
powers and allowed the British to generally 
maintain the organizing and maintenance 
structures of land tenure.3
With the Ottoman Empire’s imperialism in 
mind, the divisions of land outlined in its 
Land Code exemplify intentions of state 
land accumulation. A majority of mulk 
land cannot be appropriated by the state; 
rather, it stays in the hands of individuals 
or non-state bodies.4 However, tithe-paying 
and tribute lands are two subcategories 
of mulk land that can revert back to state 
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           With the empire’s 
imperialism in mind, the divisions 
of land outlined in the Land Code 
exemplify intentions of state land 
accumulation.”
hands because they were at one point 
under state purview.5 The state distributed 
tithe-paying lands after a victorious land 
conquest and allowed for tribute-paying 
lands to remain under the control of the 
non-Muslim inhabitants after conquest.6 
For tithe- and tribute-paying lands, once the 
owner initially determined by the state dies, 
the land transfers to mierié land. This caveat 
to mulk lands of the tithe and tribute variety 
restricts the transferability of land across 
generations and continues to build the state 
pot of property.
The Land Code explicitly describes mierié 
lands as including “arable fields, meadows, 
and winter pasturing grounds, woodlands 
and the like,” drawing explicit attention 
to the natural state of these lands.7 A 
clear parallel can be made between this 
description and John Locke’s perspective 
on land, as Locke places value on land that 
has the opportunity for exploitation.8 The 
Ottomans cannot exploit the lands already 
held in mulk beyond the taxes applied to 
lands held by non-Muslims since they agree 
with Locke’s labor-property relationship. 
This belief is affirmed later in the Land 
Code, wherein the results of any land 
cultivation by mulk owners belong to the 
owners themselves.9 Defining mierié lands 
within a natural context underscores the 
opportunity of these lands; they are ripe for 
exploitation – to be molded to fit the needs 
and desires of the state. Ottomans could use 
this land as a way to pay the timar for their 
military officials, but by maintaining this 
land’s classification as mierié, rather than 
tithe-paying land, the government maintains 
ultimate ownership and has leeway to 
make future adjustments as it sees fit. The 
nature- and state-land relationship will be 
revisited in unpacking Israel’s development 
initiatives.
With the last two categories of land – 
metrouké and mevat – Rose’s conversation 
about intent and Locke’s theories on labor 
return to the fore. Metrouké lands include 
areas such as highways and village grazing 
grounds.10 As commons, ownership and 
usufruct are expansive, prompting the 
Ottoman Empire to include a clause later in 
the Land Code stating, “no one shall erect 
any buildings or plant trees on a public 
road…. In general, no one shall do any act 
of possession on a public road.”11 Article 
93 of the Land Code explicitly defines what 
is considered an articulation of intent: an 
act that involves labor leading to a more 
permanent presence.12 The placement of 
this clarification and assertion of intent, 
though, is important and highlights the 
categories in which the Ottoman Empire 
places value. Mierié lands are prominently 
featured in the first section of the Land 
Code, signaling their utmost importance 
Mulk is privately owned land upon which the 
government levies taxes.
Mierié defines the category of state-owned 
lands.
Timar is an area of land granted to a military 
official in lieu of a salary from which the 
officer is able to keep all the profits from the 
land’s cultivation.
Metrouké lands correlate to the 
contemporary conceptions of commons.
Mevat is dead or waste land.
Terra nullius is empty land, uninhabited land 
belonging to no one.
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to the Ottoman Empire. However, Article 
93 implies a certain esteem for collectively 
held land, protecting the commons from 
acts of possession that would generally 
denote property as being individually held. 
Returning to the earlier question of whether 
Ottoman incorporation of European legal 
structures was a strategy to evoke affinity 
from the Europeans, this value marker 
placed on collective property challenges 
this position because the Europeans valued 
private property more, as Locke’s statement 
makes clear: “since [God] gave [the world] 
to [men] for their benefit and the greatest 
conveniences of life they were capable to 
draw from it, it cannot be supposed that he 
meant it should always remain in common 
and uncultivated.”13 
Finally, mevat refers to dead land that 
is uncultivated and distanced from any 
settled areas. This category becomes of 
the utmost importance once we reach the 
Israeli articulations of ownership.14 The 
Land Code does not prohibit cultivation of 
mevat land. Laboring the land is encouraged 
by the state; however, working mevat land 
will not result in the laborer acquiring mulk 
land immediately.15 In the case of mevat, 
the Ottoman Empire splits from Locke’s 
simple formula that labor and nature 
equate to personal property, adding the 
extra requirement of paying title-price to 
receive the deed for the land. Once the 
land is cultivated, it converts from mevat to 
mierié, maintaining the state’s ownership 
until the full-title price of the land is met, at 
which point the land then switches to mulk. 
Key to mevat land is that it is not owned by 
the state; anyone who is in need of land to 
cultivate can choose to work mevat land 
without permission from others.
As Rose discusses, law and legal 
structures play a key role in communication 
of property. The Ottoman Land Code 
codifies the government’s articulation 
of ownership and decrees title-deeds as 
the official communication of ownership. 
According to Article 8 of the Ottoman Land 
Code, title-deeds and holding an updated 
title-deed “showed [the owner’s] right of 
possession.”16 Ottoman Empire residents 
Figure 1. Battir, Palestine - Property divisions delineated by utilizing the natural topography (Eljamal, 2014).
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Since the Ottoman Land Code drew 
extensively from British law, once the 
Ottoman Empire fell and the League of 
Nations appointed Britain the ruler over 
Palestine, the British did not have to make 
significant alterations to the general 
structure of the existing land tenure system; 
the Ottoman Land Code was constructed 
within the Western-facing Tanzimat format. 
The British codified continuity between 
Ottoman law and British Mandate law 
through Article 46 of the Palestine Order in 
Council, stating, “the jurisdiction of the Civil 
Courts shall be exercised in conformity with 
the Ottoman Law in force in Palestine on 




did not favor these material documents as 
the West did, or as the larger governing 
body was requesting they make their claims 
to property. In Bedouin communities of 
Palestine during this time, articulations of 
land ownership consisted of two parts: oral 
history and visibility. Power and authority 
over land debates were vested in tribal 
confederations. These tribal confederations 
governed land use over collectively agreed 
upon boundaries, and they relied on 
collective memory and oral history rather 
than government-decreed documentation 
to preserve land divisions.17 To supplement 
the histories and memorial documentation, 
and very much comporting with Rose’s 
extolment of vision, Bedouins used stones 
and flora to delineate property lines.18, 19 
Just as Bedouins had a mixed approach 
to property delineation, utilizing both 
traditional modes of oral history and the 
documentative styles coming from the 
larger state bodies, the Ottoman Empire too 
recognized the role of various methods of 
communicating land ownership. While there 
is overwhelming support for and reliance 
on title-deeds and official documentation 
of land ownership, the Ottoman Land Code 
contains a clause that places trust in the 
past modes of property documentation, 
namely oral history. In cases where 
historical land markers erode or are 
made unintelligible, elders from adjacent 
communities gathered at the site in question 
to recall the past boundaries and, from their 
histories, boundaries are redocumented.20  
Ottoman history and initiatives during the 
British Mandate intersected to establish 
a strong foundation upon which the 
successive Israeli government would stand. 
Three years before the British Mandate 
period in Palestine began, the British 
government made clear its intention in 
dealing with land affairs there. In 1917, 
Lord Arthur Balfour penned the Balfour 
Declaration, in which he asserted the 
British duty to secure a Jewish homeland in 
Palestine. All of the British land initiatives 
and ordinances coming out of the Mandate 
period were in service to Balfour’s previous 
commitment to Jewish sovereignty in 
Palestine. This intention was reiterated 
explicitly in Article 4 of the British Mandate 
of Palestine. In this foundational document 
detailing British rights of rule over 
Palestine, land is mentioned twice. The first 
mention reaffirms Balfour’s Declaration 
and the second deals with the preservation 
of history, specifically around issues of 
archaeological digs and antiquities, a 
tactical justification Israel has since adopted 
in alienating Palestinian land.21 British 
history in Palestine began with voicing 
Britain’s intentions to alienate and reallocate 
the land.
 British history in Palestine 
began with voicing Britain’s 
intentions to alienate and reallocate 
the land.”
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Order, rules and regulations set forth by the 
Ottoman Land Code in 1858 stood during the 
British Mandate Period.
However, this is not to say that the laws were 
kept exactly the same during the regime 
transition. While Ottoman articulations of 
property ownership through title-deeds 
aligned with British expectations of property 
communication, there were great disparities 
in the implementation of these systems. Due 
to its vast size and decentralized structure, 
the Ottoman Empire struggled with 
enforcing the Land Code. In the law’s early 
years, title-deeds accurately communicated 
a plot of land’s owner; however, as original 
recipients of the deed died, people tended 
not to update and register the inheritors 
of the lands.22 With the discrepancy 
between landowners in reality and those 
documented, the British engaged in a 
rigorous project of land reregistration.23 
Britain’s long international colonial history 
influenced the legal mechanisms used 
during the Mandate era in Palestine. The 
impact of their colonial practices become 
most apparent in their changes to mevat 
land. At its base, colonialism holds that 
native populations waste the land in their 
possession by either not using it at all 
or inefficiently cultivating it. From the 
colonialist perspective, the Ottoman process 
of granting title-deeds to those who labored 
mevat land and paid the title-price was not 
good use of land. In 1921, one year after the 
British gained control over Palestine, they 
passed the Mevat Land Ordinance. This new 
law not only ended the Ottoman tradition 
of granting title-deeds for cultivated mevat 
lands, but it also prohibited any future 
cultivation of this land category.24 The law 
further stipulated that those who cultivated 
mevat land prior to the 1921 law must 
register their land within two months of 
the law’s publication.25 Under British land 
doctrine, mevat lands were not specifically 
claimed as state lands; they simply 
remained uncultivated, dead land owned by 
no one. Histories of colonial land practices 
converge to serve the intent established by 
Balfour. The High Commissioner, with his 
vast and vague powers to manage public 
lands, was explicitly given the directive to 
“encourage close settlement by Jews on the 
land, including State lands and waste lands 
[emphasis added].”26 With such a directive, 
it was necessary for the British Mandate 
government to determine which lands in 
Palestine qualified as waste lands that could 
then be appropriated for Jewish settlement. 
In order to maximize lands available for 
Jewish settlement, the British needed to 
curtail Palestinian claiming of mevat lands, 
thereby justifying the 1921 Mevat Land 
Ordinance. 
Moving away from the texts of land law, 
a major difference between the Ottoman 
and British Mandate land systems is 
in the delegation of power, rights, and 
responsibilities. The Ottoman Land Code 
mentions the landowners, land thieves, 
and the state, making no mention of 
an individual government position with 
duties of managing lands. In contrast, an 
appointed High Commissioner is assigned 
rights over and obligations to the land 
system during the British Mandate era. 
As noted earlier, these duties ranged 
from the broad responsibility to realize 
the Balfour Declaration’s commitment to 
Jewish settlement to the more specific 
ability to “make grants or leases of any such 
public lands…or [the High Commissioner] 
may permit such lands to be temporarily 
occupied on such terms or conditions as 
he may think fit subject to the provisions of 
 At its base, colonialism 
holds that native populations waste 
the land in their possession, either 




ARTICULATIONS OF LAND 
PROPERTY
any Ordinance.”27 This position will figure 
centrally again once we turn to Israeli land 
authorities.
British articulation over Palestine’s land did 
not have to go through the same negotiation 
and reangling seen during the Ottoman 
Empire since Britain’s communication of 
control via land policy is seen as the norm 
and understood by the rest of the West. 
Instead, the British focus on intelligibility 
was directed towards the early Zionist 
community that Balfour reassured in his 
1917 letter. Members of the British Mandate 
government needed their legal articulations 
over property to be understood in reference 
to their intent to support Jewish settlement 
and nationhood in Palestine. Their two acts 
of refining land laws set by the Ottomans 
and clarifying the intent behind their own 
land definition and acquisition complete, 
the British paved a path for Jewish land 
accumulation during the Mandate era and 
afterwards. 
Yehuda HaKohen Kook, a religious Zionist, 
said on the 19th anniversary of Israeli’s 
independence:
This is the state that the prophets 
envisioned. Of course, it has not yet 
attained perfection. But our prophets, 
our sages and those who followed them, 
said: “The seed of Abraham, Isaac, and 
Jacob will return and will reestablish 
settlement and independent political 
rule in the Land.”…Indeed, surely as 
a result of the return of Israel to their 
Land there will come about the increase 
of Torah and its glorification. But the 
first step is the settlement of Israel on 
their land!30
Claim to the land stemmed from Biblical 
rights, but in the modern context, 
articulation of such land rights needed 
to be repackaged to also incorporate 
the Lockean value of labor as claims 
to ownership. While religious Zionists 
use the Torah as evidence of their 
first possession rights to the land, 
Palestinians pass down keys and land 
documents from the British Mandate 
period to articulate ownership of land.31 
The documents they once placed little 
value in and chose not to update after 
the Ottomans first mandated the use The two approaches to Zionism of relevance 
to a conversation about property and 
ownership are religious and political 
Zionism. Through religious Zionism, a clear 
connection ties claims to the Land of Israel 
with ideas around first possession. An early 
pioneer of religious Zionism claimed “the 
belief that Israel will return to its own land 
originates with the inherent relationship 
between Israel and the land and with the 
promise that the Holy One, Blessed be 
He, will give the land to His children,” a 
sentiment that remains prevalent to this 
day.28 Other early religious Zionists used 
words such as “reclaim” or “return” in their 
writings, implying that those currently on 
the land are not the original owners of it.29 
As Israel became formally established, 
the rhetoric around religious Zionism and 
political Zionism began to converge. Zvi 
 The documents they once 
placed little value in and chose 
not to update after the Ottomans 
first mandated the use of title-
deeds in the 1858 Land Code, 
now became key evidence of 
ownership since the 1948 Nakba 
as Palestinians juxtapose legal 
documents denoting ownership 
against religious claims.”
eljamal 113
The phrase “a land without a people 
for a people without a land” has widely 
been attributed to political Zionist Israel 
Zangwill.32 This rhetoric of emptiness fits 
with the terra nullius rhetoric used in other 
settler-colonial states, including the British. 
The Israeli government continued this 
rhetoric after it took control of Palestine in 
1948. With empty land, the focus is only on 
what the land does not have; this Zionist 
slogan, though, strategically couples 
the emptiness with a landless people. 
Uninhabited, the land wastes away, purports 
the colonial mind. The Zionist notes the 
land’s emptiness and proposes itself as the 
solution.
Inherent to this claim of Jewish settlement 
as the solution to wasted Palestinian 
land is the belief that the result of Jewish 
settlement will be a blossoming of such 
lands. Such efflorescence comes in 
two forms: monetary and agricultural. 
Ze’ev Jabotinsky, an early propagandist 
of Zionism, writes, “Jewish colonization 
was bringing a rain of gold to Palestine…. 
Between 1920 and 1938 Jews pour about 
100 million pounds into Palestine.”33 While 
this example emphasizes monetary growth 
over agricultural, the decision to use the 
word “rain” alludes to features necessary 
for agricultural blossoming. Israel’s first 
Prime Minister David Ben Gurion furthers 
the claim to the land through references to 
agricultural prosperity by stating variations 
of “we will make the desert bloom,” 
including when he delivered the Declaration 
of the Establishment of the State of Israel.34 
Such statements from Ben Gurion and 
Jabotinsky keep the attention on the applied 
labor of Jews, unlike the earlier slogan of “a 
land without a people for a people without 
a land.” However, Ben Gurion alludes to 
the presence of others in the Naqab when 
saying, “if the state does not conquer 
the desert – the desert may liquidate the 
state.”35 By employing the language of 
colonial conquest, Ben Gurion seems to 
suggest there is danger associated with the 
native Bedouin population. In any variation 
of these quotations from Ben Gurion and 
Jabotinsky, though, their intent is clear: the 
Land of Israel belongs to them through the 
labor of agriculture and capital conquest. 
Kibbutzim were early manifestations of 
Israel’s bond between labor and land 
possession, actualizing Ben Gurion and 
Jabotinsky’s dreams of Jewish colonization 
through agriculture. In addition to the 
institutions of kibbutzim physically 
replicating the rhetoric of land rights via 
labor, the individuals on the kibbutz did 
as well. Called the ‘New Jews,’ they were 
physically strong and tough from working 
the land. The Hebrew term for this New 
Jew is a tzabr, which is also the word for 
the prickly-pear cactus. The association 
of the New Jew with the prickly-pear 
cactus was an attempt to show how natural 
the New Jew is as an inhabitant of the 
land.36 The prickly-pear’s association with 
belonging and indigeneity, though, is not 
unique to Israelis; Palestinians also use the 
prickly-pear cactus to symbolize their own 
rootedness in the land. For example, Sahar 
Khalifeh’s book dealing with debates over 
modes of resistance to reclaim Palestine 
is entitled al-subbar, the Arabic word for 
prickly-pear. Even more relevant to property 
claims is the fact that prickly-pear cacti 
once demarcated property boundaries in 
Palestine.
Continuing the thread of plants, the nature- 
and state-land relationship discussed as 
 Uninhabited, the land 
wastes away, purports the colonial 
mind.”
of title-deeds in the 1858 Land Code now 
became key evidence of ownership since the 
1948 Nakba as Palestinians juxtapose legal 
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part of the Ottoman mierié classification 
is also present in Jewish National Fund 
tree-planting initiatives. Belonging and 
rootedness in Israel tied itself to the 
‘blooming Israel’ rhetoric. In addition to 
embodying a plant in the idealized New Jew, 
building new forests across the country 
was a strategy for laying further claim to 
the lands by putting their labor into a rooted 
plant that eventually becomes immovable 
property. The Ottomans objected to planting 
new trees on public lands due to their 
permanence, and the Israelis took the 
same permanence logic and applied it to 
lands they wanted to pull into their purview. 
Beyond the new forests as acts of their own 
claims to land, they also erased Palestinian 
structural articulations to ownership. 
Many of the forests were built on top of 
depopulated Palestinian villages.37 Along 
with fitting Lockean values of labor, this act 
of tree plantings was also intelligible to a 
broader audience due to its visible nature. 
The previous owners of the land, whether 
legitimate or illegitimate, were rendered 
invisible, covered by the fruits of the new 
owners’ labor. All of these Israeli rhetorical 
claims based in nature, especially in the 
case of reforestation, are made on behalf of 
the entire Jewish collective while they are 
displacing and alienating large amounts of 
individually held Palestinian property. 
Moving away from the nature-based 
rhetoric and towards a conversation about 
legal articulations of property, I end on 
Jabotinsky’s rhetoric that brings in the legal 
history Israel inherited. Jabotinsky’s famous 
1923 essay, “The Iron Wall,” articulates and 
acknowledges the stage the British set for 
Zionism. He writes:
This [Zionist coonization] is our Arab 
policy; not what we should be, but what 
it actually is, whether we admit it or not. 
What need, otherwise, of the Balfour 
Declaration? Or of the Mandate? Their 
value to us is that outside power has 
undertaken to create in the country such 
conditions of administration and security 
that if the native population should 
desire to hinder our work, they will find it 
impossible.38
On an international scale, Jabotinsky quite 
clearly voices the intention of future Zionist 
endeavors to continue on the path of British 
legal structures that already facilitated 
property alienation.
Foundational to Israeli alienation of 
Palestinian property was a series of 
emergency regulations established in 
1948, specifically the Abandoned Areas 
Ordinance, Cultivation of Wastelands Law, 
and the Absentees’ Property Law. Together, 
these laws facilitated the legal alienation of 
Palestinian property.
The Abandoned Areas Ordinance facilitated 
the widespread use of the Absentees’ 
Property Law. Article 1 of the Ordinance 
defines abandoned land as “any area or 
place conquered by or surrendered to 
armed forces or deserted by all or part of its 
inhabitants, and which has been declared 
by order to be an abandoned area”; once 
declared abandoned, the land falls under 
state purview and all other Israeli laws. 
The Ordinance gave the Israeli government 
state-wide margins to deem an area 
abandoned. The unlimited range of power 
extended beyond the ability to classify lands 
as abandoned and goes on to empower 
the Prime Minister and other government 
officials to “make such regulations as he 
may deem expedient as to matters relating 
to…the expropriation and confiscation of 
moveable and immovable property, within 
any abandoned area.”39 This law delineates 
few restrictions of the state’s authority to 
classify, alienate, and claim dominion over 
these lands and simultaneously disregards 
whether the state’s own actions created 
the circumstances behind an area’s 
abandonment.
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LAND LAW HISTORIES 
CONVERGE IN 
UMM AL-HIRAN
Similarly, under the Absentees’ Property 
Law, breadth of power comes into play 
as a way to maximize amalgamation and 
accumulation of property into state control. 
Absentee property is that whose ordinary 
owner was not present at the property from 
November 29, 1947 to May 19, 1948.40 Once 
declared ‘absentee property,’ land and 
improvements fall into the state’s hands, 
ignoring the reason for the owners’ absence, 
fitting with language of the Abandoned 
Areas Ordinance.
The Cultivation of Wastelands Law has 
its roots in the 1921 British Mevat Land 
Ordinance, which protected uncultivated 
land from Palestinian claimants. In addition 
to cordoning off these swaths of land 
from Palestinian use, the rigorous land 
registration initiative under the British 
meant the Israeli government knew which 
lands were classified as waste land. While 
waste land did not immediately fall into the 
hands of the British, the Israeli legal system 
outlines several avenues through which 
the state can claim waste land. According 
to the Abandoned Areas Ordinance, waste 
lands qualify as abandoned and thus can be 
amassed by the state. Additionally, under 
Article 4 of the Cultivation of Wastelands 
Law, if the “Minister of Agriculture is not 
satisfied that the owner of the land has 
begun or is about to begin or will continue to 
cultivate the land, the Minister of Agriculture 
may assume control of the land in order to 
ensure its cultivation.”41 
Figure 2. Haifa, Palestine - Graffiti on abandoned property in Wadi Salib, a historically Palestinian neighborhood (Eljamal, 2015).
In the context of the Umm al-Hiran 
case, the history of British Mandate rule 
makes another appearance in the form 
of unrecognized villages and the Dead 
Negev Doctrine (DND), whose name itself 
connects to an understanding of ownership 
through Lockean values of labor. Israel 
deems many of the villages in the Naqab as 
‘unrecognized villages’ and therefore has 
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no responsibilities to them even though 
the inhabitants of the villages are Israeli 
citizens. The DND adds another layer to this 
complication because, for all intents and 
purposes, it rejects and denies Bedouin 
claims to the land, rendering their villages 
mevat lands. It follows that any actions 
taken to remove the Bedouins from the 
land are not acts of dispossession; rather, 
they are acts of protecting state lands.42 
The DND also claims that Bedouins are not 
considered indigenous, thereby absolving 
Israel of the rights and responsibilities 
outlined by international bodies for the 
protection of such communities.43 
In Umm al-Hiran, the histories of land 
management from the Ottoman Empire to 
the British colony to Israel contribute to 
its precarious existence. Reallocation of 
Bedouin land across the Naqab began very 
early in Israel’s existence through claiming 
lands for Jewish National Fund restoration 
projects and Jewish resettlement.44 
Beginning in 2003, Israel issued a series 
of eviction and demolition orders for Umm 
al-Hiran, with the plans of building a new 
Jewish settlement and forest in its place. 
Article 1 of the Cultivation of Waste 
Lands Law defines waste land as “land 
capable of yielding crops and which, in the 
opinion of the Minister of Agriculture, is 
uncultivated.”45 Taking into consideration 
the articulated goal of ‘making the desert 
bloom,’ the State of Israel clearly believes in 
the agricultural potential of the Naqab. The 
future implied in these statements, though, 
also means that the current use of the 
land by the Bedouins for their own pastoral 
purposes does not count as cultivating the 
land. The standards for cultivation remain 
unclear because if the new plan for Umm 
al-Hiran is a settlement, how then does the 
Bedouin use of the land for settlement not 
meet the use requirements? 
Figure 3. Al-Khalil, Palestine - Located in Al-Khalil (Hebron), a town heavily militarized by Israeli soldiers occupied by Israeli 
settlers, this graffiti asserts the Palestinian roots of the land (Eljamal, 2014).
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The DND itself was not a policy plan; 
however, it set a foundation for other policies 
to follow its directive. One such policy that 
emerged from the DND framework is the 
2011 Prawer-Begin Plan, or the Prawer 
Bill, which aimed to “solve the Bedouin 
question.”46 Following the colonial rhetoric 
of ‘modernizing the savage,’ the Prawer 
Bill’s solution was to evict Palestinians in 
unrecognized villages and resettle them in 
more urban sites.47 The Israeli State used 
aerial photographs to determine whether or 
not land was inhabited or cultivated to the 
extent necessary to deem it possessed.48 
The aerial photographs cannot account 
for Bedouin pasturing or agriculture 
practices, so if a land is caught in a time 
of rest and lacks the structures that are 
perceived as signaling habitation, then the 
land is reduced to that single snapshot and 
ostensibly can be alienated for the sake of 
the state under its authority given by the 
Cultivation of Waste Lands Law. This very 
much connects with Rose’s ideas about 
vision being part of property, and the way in 
which Israel is using these photos relates 
to a critique that has been levied against 
vision. The critique of vision eclipsing time 
becomes relevant in this case, despite 
Rose’s assertions against this consequence 
of vision.49 
conclusion
The Israeli state manages to articulate its 
claims of ownership over Umm al-Hiran 
through several legal layers. Recent legal 
claims to the land are reinforced by laws 
from 1948, which are again supported 
by authorities constructed at the state’s 
founding. To a global community, it looks 
as though Israel is operating within its 
legal structure: the Prawer Bill does not 
therefore stand out as exceptional, and 
continuity can be seen as credibility. 
Israel’s claims to land ownership cannot 
be viewed as novel practices of a young 
country. The state constructed its land 
tenure systems and practices precisely 
through the framework provided by the 
historical imperialism that dominated 
Palestine. Since the 1858 Ottoman Land 
Code, articulation of ownership hinges 
upon labor, which roots an individual to the 
tract of land and transforms mevat lands 
to spaces of productivity. Such Ottoman 
values of labor, and even more importantly 
the attempts to uncover the ‘highest and 
best uses’ of lands, resonate strongly with 
the British colonial mindset and are thus 
built upon as an opportunity for domination. 
What was once ‘dead’ land available for 
Palestinians to claim and cultivate becomes 
amalgamated property for the British 
Empire, consolidated under its land laws. 
Israel further builds upon this definition of 
waste to include emptiness, abandonment, 
and absenteeism, allowing the state to 
dispossess Palestinians of their land, 
growing its own coffers. 
Land viewed as waste land is seen as 
an issue; in reality, though, the British 
and Israeli governments value and covet 
purportedly wasted land as an opportunity. 
A wider definition of waste land means a 
broader sphere for alienation. Thus, land 
laws that date back to the Ottoman era and 
uphold the Lockean perspective of labor 
as a communication of property ownership 
work hard to eliminate the opportunities 
for Palestinians to claim historic and 
current ownership through this method 
and other modes of articulation developed 
and established by past regimes, as is 
apparent through the case of Umm al-Hiran. 
Through this exploration into the tactics 
and strategies of land accumulation and 
alienation, we see how such methods of 
communication are not temporally confined; 
rather, imperial and colonial strategies 
maintain their prominence today, raging 
in contemporary Israel and successfully 
continuing to alienate Palestinian land.
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